Michael Howard’s attack on Tony Blair for ‘lying’ over the Iraq War is inept, opportunistic and squalid. Inept because, although people generally believe Blair did lie (which I do not), it reminds them that Howard would have supported this unpopular war too. Opportunistic, because he is trying to have it every which way – supporting the war, and acknowledging (on Sky News) that it was ‘probably legal’ and yet seeking to profit from the popular opposition to the war by attacking Blair over it.

And more important than these factors, squalid because the basis of his attack is deeply and startlingly misleading. His claim that Blair lied is based on the Butler report on the use of intelligence on Iraq, from which he selects the phrase used by the Joint Intelligence Committee that the intelligence was ‘sporadic and patchy’ while Blair claimed it was overwhelming. But Howard omitted to mention what, according to the Butler report, the JIC went on to say:

‘270. The JIC produced in parallel a ‘status report’ on Iraq’s nuclear, biological, chemical and ballistic missile programmes. It warned in the text (although not in the Key Judgements) that: Intelligence on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile programmes is sporadic and patchy. Iraq is also well practised in the art of deception, such as concealment and exaggeration. A complete picture of the various programmes is therefore difficult. But it is clear that Iraq continues to pursue a policy of acquiring WMD and their delivery means. Intelligence indicates that planning to reconstitute some of its programmes began in 1995. WMD programmes were then given a further boost in 1998 with the withdrawal of UNSCOM inspectors. [JIC, 15 March 2002]’

And there was much more in this vein. On Iraq’s nuclear programme:

‘272. Underpinning this assessment, the JIC noted that: Although there is very little intelligence we continue to judge that Iraq is pursuing a nuclear weapons programme. We assess the programme to be based on gas centrifuge uranium enrichment . . . Recent intelligence indicates that nuclear scientists were recalled to work on a nuclear programme in the autumn of 1998,but we do not know if large scale development work has yet recommenced. Procurement of dual-use items over the past few years could be used in a uranium enrichment programme. [JIC, 15 March 2002]’

On Iraq’s chemical weapons programme:

‘275. Underpinning these judgements, the JIC said that:
We continue to judge that Iraq has an offensive chemical warfare (CW) programme, although there is very little intelligence relating to it. From the evidence available to us, we believe Iraq retains some production equipment, and some small stocks of CW agent precursors, and may have hidden small quantities of agents and weapons. Anomalies in Iraqi declarations to UNSCOM suggest stocks could be much larger. [JIC, 15 March 2002]’

On Iraq’s biological weapons programme:

277. On Iraq’s biological weapons programme, the JIC sustained its prior judgement that: Iraq currently has available, either from pre Gulf War stocks or more recent production, a number of biological agents. Iraq could produce more of these biological agents within days. [JIC, 15 March 2002]

278. Underpinning this judgement, the JIC reported that: BW work continued throughout the period of UNSCOM inspections and intelligence indicates that this programme continues. Key figures from the pre-Gulf War programme are reported to be involved. Research and development is assessed to continue under cover of a number of legitimate institutes and possibly in a number of covert facilities . . . There is no intelligence on any BW agent production facilities but one source indicates that Iraq may have developed mobile production facilities. [JIC, 15 March 2002]

And also:

281. On the longer-range systems themselves, and Iraq’s indigenous capabilities, the JIC said that: Iraq has rebuilt much of the military production infrastructure associated with the missile programme damaged in the Gulf War and the few high profile sites targeted in Operation Desert Fox in 1998. New infrastructure is being built, with a particular focus on improving the support to the solid propellant missile programme.

and that:

Iraq is seeking to develop new, larger liquid and solid propellant missiles, contrary to UN limits. Recent intelligence indicates personnel associated with the Al Samoud programme have now been tasked to concentrate on designing liquid propellant systems with ranges of 2000–3000km. New intelligence indicates the main focus may be on the development of a SCUD derivative, which we judge has an intended range of around 1200km . . . Providing sanctions remain effective, Iraq is unlikely to be able to produce a longer-range missile before 2007. [JIC, 15 March 2002]

Elsewhere, Butler recorded of government officials:

‘261. They set against those objectives an analysis of whether the policy of containment had worked, drawing heavily on JIC assessments, concluding that: Since 1991,the policy of containment has been partially successful: - Sanctions have effectively frozen Iraq’s nuclear programme; - Iraq has been prevented from rebuilding its chemical arsenal to pre-Gulf War levels; - Ballistic missile programmes have been severely restricted; - Biological weapons (BW) and Chemical Weapons (CW) programmes have been hindered; - No Fly Zones established over northern and southern Iraq have given some protection to the Kurds and the Shia. Although subject to continuing political pressure, the Kurds remain autonomous; and - Saddam has not succeeded in seriously threatening his neighbours.

but also that:

Iraq continues to develop weapons of mass destruction, although our intelligence is poor. Iraq has up to 20 650km range missiles left over from the Gulf War. These are capable of hitting Israel and the Gulf states. Design work for other ballistic missiles over the UN limit of 150km continues. Iraq continues with its BW and CW programmes and, if it has not already done so,could produce significant quantities of BW agents within days and CW agent within weeks of a decision to do so. We believe it could deliver CBW by a variety of means, including in ballistic missile warheads. There are also some indications of a continuing nuclear programme. Saddam has used WMD in the past and could do so again if his regime were threatened.’

On which Butler concluded:

‘262. We consider this part of the advice to be a fair and balanced summary of the most recent JIC assessments.’

In other words, despite the fact that the intelligence was 'sporadic and patchy', the overwhelming and continuous assessment by the intelligence service leading up to the war was that Saddam was still very much in the WMD business. Faced with such an assessment, what Prime Minister would not have concluded that Saddam was an increasing danger? So where is the evidence in Butler that he lied? Is it not rather Michael Howard who has played fast and loose with the facts?

Posted by melanie at April 26, 2005