One of the most distressing features of debate in Britain at present is the way error is cemented as fact. In the Times, Mary Ann Sieghart repeats the mantra that we went to war with Iraq on the basis of bad intelligence. She claims:

'The failure of MI6 to get its facts right about Saddam's weapons of mass destruction was catalogued meticulously in Lord Butler of Brockwell's report. Of the five main sources reporting on WMD, the evidence of three turned out to be unreliable. The other two painted a much less worrying picture of Saddam's WMD capability. What is more, says Butler, the validation procedures that should have tested sources' credibility were inadequate.'

It would have been nice had Sieghart catalogued meticulously Lord Butler's report. For she has seriously misrepresented what this said. Yes, he did itemise faulty intelligence — but crucially, only after the summer of 2002. He wrote:

'16. Validation of human intelligence sources after the war has thrown doubt on a high proportion of those sources and of their reports, and hence on the quality of the intelligence assessments received by Ministers and officials in the period from summer 2002 to the outbreak of hostilities (my emphasis). Of the main human intelligence sources: a. One SIS main source reported authoritatively on some issues, but on others was passing on what he had heard within his circle. b. Reporting from a sub-source to a second SIS main source that was important to JIC [Joint Intelligence Committee] assessments on Iraqi possession of chemical and biological weapons must be open to doubt. 151 c. Reports from a third SIS main source have been withdrawn as unreliable. d. Reports from two further SIS main sources continue to be regarded as reliable, although it is notable that their reports were less worrying than the rest about Iraqi chemical and biological weapons capabilities. e. Reports received from a liaison service on Iraqi production of biological agent were seriously flawed, so that the grounds for JIC assessments drawing on those reports that Iraq had recently-produced stocks of biological agent no longer exist. (Paragraph 436)'

But his report also says that in 2000 and 2001, the JIC warned:

'It is likely that Iraq is continuing to develop its offensive chemical warfare (CW) and biological warfare (BW) capabilities… 'Facilities formerly associated with Iraq’s chemical warfare programme at its Habbaniyah I and II sites are being reconstructed… 'We believe that Iraq retains some production equipment, stocks of CW precursors, agent and weapons. . . 'We assess that within a year Iraq will begin production of Al Samoud and possibly its extended range version. Both could deliver a conventional, chemical or biological warhead.’

It also said:

'The JIC assessment of May 2001 cautioned that: Our picture of Iraq’s BW programme is unclear.[JIC, 10 May 2001]
241. It went on to record, however, that it had:
. . . good intelligence of one facility that could be used to support BW agent production.
and that:
Other intelligence which points to the possible research and production of BW agent is unconfirmed. We believe Iraq retains equipment and materials to produce BW. . . [JIC, 10 May 2001]
242. In support of these judgements, the assessment pointed to additional intelligence on:
Iraqi attempts to recruit new scientists by people formerly associated with Iraq’s BW programme to work on BW related research,including genetic engineering.
and:
Evidence of increased activity at a former BW associated plant in Amiriyah. [JIC, 10 May 2001]
243. The new intelligence came from human intelligence and imagery. Although the human intelligence was recording events that had taken place some time previously, we conclude that it was fairly reflected by the JIC.
244. Continuing intelligence reports from the liaison service on Iraqi mobile biological agent production facilities had a significant impact on the next JIC assessment, produced in February 2002, which noted that:
Iraq . . . if it has not already done so,could produce significant quantities of BW agent within days. . . .'

And Butler concluded:

'255. By early 2002, therefore, readers of JIC assessments will have had an impression of: a. The continuing clear strategic intent on the part of the Iraqi regime to pursue its nuclear, biological, chemical and ballistic missile programmes. b. Continuing efforts by the Iraqi regime to sustain and where possible develop its indigenous capabilities, including through procurement of necessary materiel. c. The development, drawing on those capabilities, of Iraq’s ‘break-out’ potential in the chemical, biological and ballistic missile fields, coupled with the proven ability to weaponise onto some delivery systems chemical and biological agent.'

In other words, although Butler said that some of the intelligence directly before the war turned out to have been dodgy, and caveats warning of the unreliability of intelligence should have been recorded in the government's famous dossier but were not, any fair-minded person reading the totality of the intelligence Butler recorded would surely conclude that the intelligence services had maintained consistently that Saddam continued to pose a threat from WMD well before the summer of 2002, and that there has never been any indication that that intelligence was false.

In other words, this was pretty well the opposite of what Sieghart wrote. Yet her version is the one that is now generally believed. Thus ignorance, error and irrationality are now the order of the day.

Posted by melanie at January 13, 2005