The Tory party leader, Michael Howard, has now plumbed hitherto unthinkable depths of quite disgraceful -- and dangerous -- opportunism. He has explicitly accused the Prime Minister of lying to the country over the reasons for the Iraq war. As the Telegraph reports:

‘Mr Howard told the New Statesman: “I think people hold the view pretty firmly now that they were lied to over Iraq. I don't think that's the only thing they were lied to about - but Iraq is the great catalyst for the loss of trust in the Government."”Asked whether he believed the British people were lied to, Mr Howard replied: “Over Iraq? Yes.” Mr Howard said Mr Blair had “lied” when he had intelligence “which was hedged with qualifications, caveats, warnings, which he translated into certainty. That was the unambiguous evidence that he put to the country”.’

But if you read the Butler report into the use of intelligence on Iraq, it is plain that no such inference can possibly be drawn that the Prime Minister lied, embellished or exaggerated the evidence. Indeed, Butler explicitly says that he did not. Some of the attention paid to the government’s Iraq dossier, he says, arose from:

‘…subsequent allegations that the intelligence in the September dossier had knowingly been embellished, and hence over the good faith of the Government. Lord Hutton dismissed those allegations. We should record that we, too, have seen no evidence that would support any such allegations.’

What Butler did say, however, was that the dossier had omitted the caveats and health warnings that the Joint Intelligence Committee had originally included about some of their assessments:

‘We believe that it was a serious weakness that the JIC’s warnings on the limitations of the intelligence underlying some of its judgements were not made sufficiently clear in the dossier’.

But then, also: ‘In general, subject to the points below and others identified in Chapter 6, the statements in the dossier reflected fairly the judgements of past JIC assessments.’

Yes, those caveats should have been included. But their omission does not turn the presentation of the JIC evidence into a lie. Howard says the omission made the evidence seem firmer than it warranted. Well, yes; but if you read the weight of all the evidence submitted over many years by the JIC, it is clear that it was warning consistently that Saddam was continuing to bend every muscle to produce chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, and that, as the JIC also said, sanctions could not be relied upon to contain him. You do not come away thinking there were too many caveats to take this seriously. Here is a reminder of the kind of thing the JIC was saying, as reported by Butler:

‘Iraq currently has available, either from pre Gulf War stocks or more recent production, a number of biological agents. Iraq could produce more of these biological agents within days… BW work continued throughout the period of UNSCOM inspections and intelligence indicates that this programme continues. Key figures from the pre-Gulf War programme are reported to be involved. Research and development is assessed to continue under cover of a number of legitimate institutes and possibly in a number of covert facilities…Although there is very little intelligence we continue to judge that Iraq is pursuing a nuclear weapons programme…

‘Following a decision to do so, Iraq could produce:
- significant quantities of mustard within weeks;
- significant quantities of sarin and VX within months, and in the case of VX may have already done so... We continue to judge that Iraq has an offensive chemical warfare (CW) programme, although there is very little intelligence relating to it. From the evidence available to us, we believe Iraq retains some production equipment, and some small stocks of CW agent precursors, and may have hidden small quantities of agents and weapons. Anomalies in Iraqi declarations to UNSCOM suggest stocks could be much larger…We have examined the intelligence underpinning these judgements and on missile
development found it substantial…

‘Although we have little intelligence on Iraq’s CBW doctrine, and know little about Iraq’s CBW work since late 1998,we judge it likely that Saddam would order the use of CBW against coalition forces at some point, probably after coalition attacks had begun. Iraqi CBW use would become increasingly likely the closer coalition forces came to Baghdad. Military targets might include troop concentrations or important fixed targets in rear areas such as ports and airfields…We judge that at this stage, Saddam would order the unrestrained use of CBW against coalition forces, supporting regional states and Israel, although he would face practical problems of command and control, the loyalty of his commanders, logistics problems and the availability of chemical or biological agents in sufficient quantities to be effective and the means to deliver them.’

Yes, Butler observed that ‘we were struck by the relative thinness of the intelligence base’. But the JIC assessment just before the war warned of:

‘a. The continuing clear strategic intent on the part of the Iraqi regime to pursue its nuclear, biological, chemical and ballistic missile programmes. b. Continuing efforts by the Iraqi regime to sustain and where possible develop its indigenous capabilities. c. The apparent considerable development, drawing on these capabilities, of Iraq’s ‘break-out’ potential.’

What responsible Prime Minister could possibly have said: ’Hmmn, frightening stuff – but those caveats mean I can just ignore all this because to assume that there is this threat from Saddam is unnecessarily alarmist’. Or are we to assume that that is how Howard would have responded had he been Prime Minister?

There are certainly criticisms that can be levelled at the Prime Minister for using intelligence at all to try to convince the public. The point about caveats is well made; all intelligence is speculative, and some or much of it may eventually be proved wrong. So much is the nature of the beast. But to imply, therefore, that it should all be disregarded is palpably absurd. And to state that the Prime Minister lied by conveying to the public the broad thrust of those intelligence warnings – which had been saying the same thing consistently for years – that Saddam posed a grave threat from his CBW programmes is untrue and despicable.

It also lines up the Conservative party squarely behind those who are attempting – with increasing success – not just to discredit Tony Blair but to induce such cynicism and fury about the Iraq war that Britain withdraws its troops, peels off from the US and undermines the defence of the west. That may not be Michael Howard’s personal agenda – indeed, it almost certainly is not. But by lending his authority to this despicable and opportunistic attack, he has placed the Conservative Party firmly on the wrong side of this great fight to defend the free world.

Posted by melanie at September 30, 2004