Dore Gold, author of a seminal book about the links between Saudi Arabia and terror, provides a magisterial overview of the key points of importance that have arisen from the recent rash of intelligence-related reports. On the relationship between Saddam and al Qaeda, he says this:

'What emerges from these intelligence details is that Iraq had an ongoing and cooperative relationship with al-Qaeda that intensified after 2001. The Butler Committee even added: "some reports also suggest that Iraq may have trained some al-Qaeda terrorists since 1998." True, there is no persuasive evidence available to link Iraq to the 9/11 attacks. But there were grounds for concern that if Iraq continued along the same path, expertise in weapons of mass destruction might have been provided to al-Qaeda.

'David Kay, who headed the Iraq Survey Group looking for Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, announced in October 2003 that he had not yet found prohibited weaponry. However, in early 2004 he appeared on FOX Television and concluded: "We know there were terrorist groups in state [Iraq] still seeking WMD capability. Iraq, although I found no weapons, had tremendous capabilities in this area. A marketplace phenomenon was about to occur, if it did not occur; sellers meeting buyers. And I think that would have been dangerous if the war had not intervened."10

'The Senate report added another important element to this observation: "The Central Intelligence Agency's judgment that Saddam Hussein, if sufficiently desperate, might employ terrorists with a global reach - al-Qaeda - to conduct terrorist attacks in the event of war, was reasonable. No information has emerged thus far to suggest that Saddam did try to employ al-Qaeda in conducting terrorist attacks." '

And on the relationship between Saudi and al Qaeda, Gold points out that although there was no evidence of an institutional connection there was plenty of evidence of other ties, not least the sheer number of Saudis who were recuited to the jihad. In the light of all this evidence, and the resistance to drawing the obvious conclusions from it, Gold has this to say:

'The debate over 9/11 intelligence ultimately involves a question of the degree of proof that observers expect in order to determine whether certain relationships exist. Do analysts expect a written "memorandum of understanding" between Iraq and al-Qaeda in order to establish that a cooperative relationship existed? Aren't the provision of a safe haven to al-Qaeda and reports of Iraqi training of its operatives a sufficient source of concern? Similarly, is it necessary to produce a check signed by a senior Saudi official to an al-Qaeda operative in order to prove Saudi financial backing of the organization? Doesn't the movement of funds to al-Qaeda from charities financed and monitored by the Saudi government raise serious questions about Riyadh's past role in the growth of the new terrorism?'

Unfortunately, our society currently does require precisely such certainty before it is prepared to concede that there is a risk; indeed, unless there is such certainty, it goes further and denies all the evidence that common-sense suggests such a risk exists. Since certainty in such matters is usually impossible, this society will fail to acknowledge this risk until it is too late. And our intelligence agencies, since they have now been told in no uncertain terms that the public does not want to hear about such risks unless there is uranium-enriched proof, labelled, dated and signed in triplicate by dictators and terrorists and with western targets stencilled on the side, they may well ignore any future evidence of the mortal danger facing the west that comes their way -- just as they did before.

Posted by melanie at July 27, 2004