The latest attack in Saudi Arabia shows once again, for those who have eyes to see, that the root grievance behind al Qaeda is not the absence of a Palestinian state, nor the supposedly 'inflammatory' coalition occupation of Iraq, but the presence of 'the infidel' in Saudi Arabia. A statement claiming to be from al Qaeda said:

'We renew our determination to repel the crusader forces and their arrogance, to liberate the land of Muslims, to apply Sharia and cleanse the Arabian peninsula of infidels.'

An analysis in the Times points out that Saudi is still unable or unwilling to kill the monster it has created:

'Despite the wish of Washington that Saudi society should be reformed, with elections, freedom of expression and the like, the Saudi Government is instead looking in the other direction — becoming more conservative. Worried about religious legitimacy and their claim to guard the holy cities of Mecca and Medina (the ailing King Fahd’s official title is “Custodian of the Two Holy Places”), Saudi princes are burnishing their Islamic credentials and trying to undermine bin Laden’s.

Condemnation can also be expected from Sheikh Abdul Aziz al-Asheikh, the Grand Mufti and head of the tame religious Establishment...Worried about their own necks, the Saudi royal family tolerates a political fudge, hoping that it can reduce support for al-Qaeda from among its citizens and win the battle for Islamic legitimacy. Al-Qaeda recognises the basic rules, targeting foreigners. Hence, no direct attacks on members of the House of Saud itself. Before 9/11, Western officials say that senior princes were paying off bin Laden to avoid targeting the kingdom altogether. That changed when Western pressure stopped the payments. For the West, this means more terrorism and high oil prices.'

The point is that, although the extremist Wahhabi Saudi regime has created (and exported throughout the world) Islamist fanaticism, the likes of bin Laden regard it as not merely treacherous in its relationship with the US but also as a theological sell-out. As Daniel Pipes explains in The Australian, in 1930 the Saudi rulers cracked down on the even more extreme Ikhwan form of Wahhabism:

'The Ikhwan approach to Islam did not die in 1930, however. It retreated and maintained a hold over rearguard elements. As the Saudi monarchy blossomed in the oil age into an ever more inflated and hypocritical institution, the appeal of the Ikhwan message gained ground. This purist appeal first reached world attention in 1979, when an Ikhwan-like group of youths overtook the Grand Mosque in Mecca and held it for two weeks. The same Ikhwan-like approach emerged in Saudi-sponsored Mujaheddin efforts to push the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan in 1979-89. The Taliban regime embodied this approach during its five years in power, until the US-led war brought it down in 2001.

'From all indications, this outlook has wide appeal in Saudi Arabia; it certainly has more support than the liberal approach Westerners would prefer to see succeed. In light of this history, the spate of violence during the past year points to a profound Saudi dispute in which the winner takes all, just as in the ‘20s. Who prevails decides whether Saudi Arabia remains a monarchy that to some extent bends to the imperatives of modern life, or becomes an Islamic emirate reminiscent of the Taliban's rule in Afghanistan. For Western states, the choice is an unhappy one, between the Saudi monarchy with all its faults and the still worse Ikhwan alternative. The policy options are thus limited to helping the monarchy defeat the even more radical threat while pressuring it to make improvements in a range of areas, from financial corruption to funding militant Islamic organisations worldwide.'

Some choice!